Consciousness and Emotion
Demian Whiting
March 15, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9781315676982-24 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 7 |
| Key points | Argues that the claim emotions feel a certain way is consistent both with the view that felt quality is a non-constitutive or extrinsic property of emotion and with the stronger view that emotions are constituted by their characteristic phenomenology. Contends that if emotions are how they feel, this creates serious difficulties for the view that emotions are neural or bodily states, which do not seem to have consciousness built into them. |
Abstract
This chapter addresses three questions: first, what is meant by saying that emotions are conscious; second, why does it matter whether emotions are conscious; and third, is it the case that emotions are always conscious. The claim that emotions feel a certain way is consistent also with two further ideas. To begin with, it is consistent with the view that the what-it-is-likeness of emotion is a non-constitutive or extrinsic property of emotion. The claim that emotions feel a certain way is consistent as well with a stronger and potentially more interesting view, namely the idea that emotions are constituted by their characteristic phenomenology or way of feeling. To say that emotions are not bodily states isn&s;t to rule out the idea that emotions require a body, however. If emotions are how they feel, then that will create serious difficulties for the view that emotions are neural or bodily states, which do not seem to have consciousness built into them.