A further problem of the hard problem of consciousness
Fasiku Gbenga, RT Oyelakin
IFE PsychologIA September 14, 2011 DOI: 10.4314/ifep.v19i2.69573 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the claim that mental experience gives rise to phenomenal properties is an unjustified assertion about the world, and that justifying it constitutes a further problem within the hard problem of consciousness. Proposes that assertions about phenomenal properties are wholly epistemological, so the hard problem of consciousness stems from human reasoning rather than an ontological process. |
Abstract
There is a prevalent assumption that the fact that a mental experience has a phenomenal property is an ontological fact and that the problem of explaining the phenomenal property of a mental experience isan epistemological problem. Contrary to this assumption, the paper argues that the claim that mental experience gives rise to phenomenal propertyis an assertion about the world, which is yet to be adequately justified. Justifying this assertion is identified as the further problem of the hard problem of consciousness. This shows that assertions about phenomenal properties of mental experiences are wholly epistemological. Hence, the problem of explaining phenomenal properties of a mental state is not a metaphysical problem, and what is considered a hard problem of consciousness is due to human reasoning process rather than an ontological process.
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