The Dioptrique
Walter Ott
Oxford Scholarship Online May 18, 2017 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198791713.003.0004 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Descartes's Optics presents a distinct account of sensory experience from the Meditations, one that displaces the brain image in favor of two mechanisms: a purely causal process, where the ordination of nature explains sensations triggered by brain motions for both proper and common sensibles, and an added inferential process involving the doctrine of natural geometry. |
Abstract
Descartes’s treatment of perception in the Optics, though published before the Meditations, contains a distinct account of sensory experience. The end of the chapter suggests some reasons for this oddity, but that the two accounts are distinct is difficult to deny. Descartes in the present work topples the brain image from its throne. In its place, we have two mechanisms, one purely causal, the other inferential. Where the proper sensibles are concerned, the ordination of nature suffices to explain why a given sensation is triggered on the occasion of a given brain motion. The same is true with regard to the common sensibles. But on top of this purely causal story, Descartes re-introduces his doctrine of natural geometry.