Descartes: A Metaphysical Solution to the Mind–Body Relation and the Intellect's Clear and Distinct Conception of the Union
Andrea Christofidou
Philosophy August 23, 2018 DOI: 10.1017/s0031819118000323 (opens in new tab)
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the mind–body relation can be solved by treating mind and body as distinct in kind, and that Descartes' commitments allow a clear and distinct conception of their union. Proposes a novel reading of Descartes' Causal Principle as neutral and causality as unanalysable and fundamental, concluding that mind–body interaction requires the presupposition and uniqueness of the union. |
Abstract
Abstract First, I offer a solution to the metaphysical problem of the mind–body relation, drawing on the fact of its distinctness in kind. Secondly, I demonstrate how, contrary to what is denied, Descartes’ metaphysical commitments allow for the intellect's clear and distinct conception of the mind–body union. Central to my two-fold defence is a novel account of the metaphysics of Descartes’ Causal Principle: its neutrality, and the unanalysable, fundamental nature of causality. Without the presupposition, and uniqueness of the mind-body union there can be no mind-body interaction; this throws new light on current concerns in metaphysics and philosophy of mind.