Representations of the Body and Self-Knowledge

Abstract

Condillac’s Treatise on Sensations constitutes a spectacular departure from Locke and expounds an original philosophy of consciousness and self-consciousness. Although there are other readings of the Treatise , this chapter sets out to investigate the relevance of the correspondence between Condillac’s analysis and contemporary naturalistic theories for his theses. Putting to one side Condillac’s principle of the sentiment-based logical “generation” of the faculties, which is alien to post-Darwinism, I will consider the different forms of self-knowledge identified by Condillac as conditions of the emergence of self-consciousness. The aim of this is to establish a criterion for self-knowledge. By cross-referencing and translating two languages, two eras and two traditions, the chapter will then proceed to the discussion of arguments and claims shared by Condillac and contemporary naturalists: first, the thesis that only human beings have self-consciousness; second, that humans share elementary self-relations with animals; and, third, that representations of one’s own body are essential to self-consciousness formation.