Locke and the Mysteries of Perception

Abstract

Abstract John Locke’s theory of perception takes shape in a time of chaos: the orthodox account of this most basic tie between mind and world is crumbling. Among the ruins, new combatants vie for dominance against the old Aristotelian view, chief among them the Cartesians and the neo-Epicureans. The aim of this book is to provide a unified reading of Locke’s theory of perception, informed by works with which Locke himself was familiar. The tensions that have long puzzled Locke’s readers can often be resolved by attending to the goals and assumptions that propel his thought. Locke emerges as a transitional figure, struggling to reconcile elements of three disparate positions. Locke is no Aristotelian, but he will cling to their doctrine of common sensibles. He is no Cartesian, but he will exploit their theory of natural judgement. He is no Epicurean, but he will appeal to the passivity of sense perception to guarantee its accuracy. Driven by his commitment to experience as both the ultimate tribunal and the sole source of our ideas, Locke will try to meld all three positions into a coherent philosophy of perception capable of accommodating the results of Kepler and the new science. Whether he can succeed is the chief question of this book.