Bayle and Panpsychism
Jean-Luc Solère
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie January 20, 2017 DOI: 10.1515/agph-2017-0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Bayle cannot endorse an enhanced materialism resembling panpsychism because his Cartesian commitment to one principal attribute per substance rules out conjoining thought with matter in a simple substance, and that this constraint clarifies the metaphysics and epistemology modern panpsychists must adopt. |
Abstract
Abstract: Pierre Bayle shows that, in order to avoid devastating objections, materialism should postulate that the property of thinking does not emerge from certain material combinations but is by nature present everywhere in matter – a hypothesis recently revived and labelled “panpsychism.” There are reasons for entertaining the idea that Bayle actually considers this enhanced materialism to be sound, as it might use the same line of defence that Bayle outlined for Stratonism. However, this would lead to a view similar to Locke’s superaddition theory, and I contend that such cannot be Bayle’s position because he embraces the Cartesian principle that each substance has only one principal attribute. As a consequence, for Bayle any system that conjoins thought with matter in the same simple substance is untenable. By contrast, this makes clear which kinds of metaphysics and epistemology modern panpsychists need to adopt in order to defend their view.