Panpsychism and Emergent Mentalism: The Biocognitive Model of Mind
Niall McLaren
Ethical Human Psychology and Psychiatry April 15, 2026 DOI: 10.1891/ehpp-2025-0027 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that panpsychism, which posits mentality as additive effects of mental properties in fundamental particles, is an unnecessary concept for addressing the mind's insubstantial nature, given materialism's limitations. |
Abstract
The raw material of the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry is the insubstantial and unlocalized mind, yet Western science has no means of coming to terms with anything other than material entities. Indeed, within the scientific community, the concept of an immaterial yet causally effective mind is viewed with considerable distaste. Nonetheless, repeated attempts to build a formal theory of mind within the materialist framework have achieved little beyond polemics. Panpsychism is the doctrine that mentality is constituted by the additive effects of mental properties inherent in the fundamental particles of which all matter is composed. While this appears to resolve a few of the traditional questions of the insubstantial mind, it will be argued that the concept is unnecessary.