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From commonsense to science, and back: the use of cognitive concepts in neuroscience.

Jolien C. Francken, Marc Slors

Consciousness and Cognition October 2014 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2014.08.019 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Attention Cognitive control Cognitive neuroscience Concepts Consciousness Interpretivism Memory Mental realism Ontology
Key points Argues that translations between commonsense cognitive concepts and brain activity are made in implicit, loose, and unsystematic ways, leading to hard-to-connect data and possibly unwarranted extrapolations. The authors contend this stems from a covert adherence to 'mental realism' and propose that explicitly adopting interpretivism would yield clearer, more systematic use of CCCs and caution about big conclusions.

Abstract

Commonsense cognitive concepts (CCCs) are the concepts used in daily life to explain, predict and interpret behaviour. CCCs are also used to convey neuroscientific results, not only to wider audiences but also to the scientific inner circle. We show that translations from CCCs to brain activity, and from brain data to CCCs are made in implicit, loose and unsystematic ways. This results in hard to connect data as well as possibly unwarranted extrapolations. We argue that the cause of these problems is a covert adherence to a position known in philosophy of mind as 'mental realism'. The most fruitful way forward to a clearer and more systematic employment of CCCs in cognitive neuroscience, we argue, is to explicitly adopt interpretivism as an alternative for mental realism. An interpretative stance will help to avoid conceptual confusion in cognitive science and implies caution when it comes to big conclusions about CCCs.

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