Neural correlates and causal mechanisms.
Consciousness and Cognition June 2012 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.06.006 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that while Neisser is right to call for more philosophy of science in understanding neural correlates of consciousness, Neisser's appeal to a key philosophical idea needs clarification, the orthodox NCC definition is more resourceful than Neisser allows, and the phenomenological conception of conscious experience underlying part of Neisser's argument can be resisted. |
Abstract
What Joseph Neisser calls for is exactly right: more philosophy of science will help us better understand and refine the idea of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). But (i) the key bit of philosophy of science Neisser appeals to is itself in need of clarification; (ii) the orthodox NCC definition is more resourceful than Neisser allows, and (iii) it is possible to resist the phenomenological conception of conscious experience that fuels some of Neisser's argument.
Citations in the library
Cited by 2
- Slow cortical potentials and "inner time consciousness" - A neuro-phenomenal hypothesis about the "width of present". International Journal of Psychophysiology May 1, 2016
- The origins of the brain's endogenous electromagnetic field and its relationship to provision of consciousness. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience June 1, 2014