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Dream experience and a revisionist account of delusions of misidentification.

Philip Gerrans

Consciousness and Cognition January 5, 2012 DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2011.11.003 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Keywords Face Humans Delusions Reality testing Dreams Deja vu Pattern recognition, visual Models, psychological Sense of coherence
Key points Argues that the standard account of delusions of misidentification—as responses to anomalous experiences—should be retained in part, because cognitive models of feature binding explain familiarity-face mismatches, which also appear in déjà vu, jamais vu, and some dream states. This supports keeping the conscious-experience component despite revisionist claims that such binding anomalies are not consciously experienced.

Abstract

Standard accounts of delusion explain them as responses to experience. Cognitive models of feature binding in the face recognition systems explain how experiences of mismatch between feelings of "familiarity" and faces can arise. Similar mismatches arise in phenomena such as déjà and jamais vu in which places and scenes are mismatched to feelings of familiarity. These cognitive models also explain similarities between the phenomenology of these delusions and some dream states which involve mismatch between faces, feelings of familiarity and identities. Given these similarities it makes sense to retain that aspect of the standard account in the face of revisionist arguments that feature binding anomalies which lead to delusions of misidentification are not consciously experienced.

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