On habit and the mind-body problem. The view of Felix Ravaisson
Leandro Gaitán, J. Castresana
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience September 9, 2014 DOI: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00684 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Ravaisson's 1838 Of Habit, drawing on Aristotle, Leibniz, Hume, Maine de Biran, and Schelling, treats habit as key to resolving fundamental philosophical problems such as mind-body, nature-freedom, and nature-culture relations, and that its 2008 English translation has spurred renewed debate. Ravaisson's focus on habit contrasts with the post-Cartesian emphasis on consciousness. |
Abstract
In his book De l'habitude (Of Habit), 1838, the philosopher and archeologist Felix Ravaisson deals with the study of habit by using a broad spectrum of sources ranging from Aristotle to Butler, Leibniz, Hume, Main de Biran and Schelling, among others. The combination of these authors together with the originality of Ravaisson's own results produces a work which, though brief, has inspired some of the most important contemporary philosophers1. Moreover, this book has recently (2008) been translated into English for the first time, which has favored its rediscovery and redefinition in the context of current debates. Indeed, Ravaisson seems to have found in the study of habit a key point for the solution of some of the fundamental problems of philosophy such as the relationship between mind and body, nature and freedom, and nature and culture (Carlisle, 2013). Moreover, his approach is distinguished from the dominant method that from Descartes onwards has been focused on the study of consciousness rather than precisely on habit.