Comments on Fisette’s: “Franz Brentano and higher-order theories of consciousness”
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia 2015 DOI: 10.36517/arf.v7i13.19087 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Fisette's interpretation of Brentano as a first-order theorist is correct, but rejects the claims that all mental states are or can become conscious and that first-order consciousness of some mental states must be accounted for as self-consciousness. Proposes an alternative picture of mental states and consciousness informed by Leibniz rather than Aristotle or Descartes. |
Abstract
In this paper, I discuss Fisette’s Interpretation of Brentano’s philosophy of mind in the framework of the modern higher-order theories, especially Rosenthal’s version. While acknowledging the truth of Fisette’s rendering of Brentano’s psychology as a first-order theory, I examine at length the theses that all mental states are conscious states, or can became conscious states, and that the first-order consciousness of some mental states must be accounted for as self-consciousness. I disagree with both theses, and I propose a general picture of mental states and consciousness in keeping with some insights coming from Leibniz, and not from Aristotle or Descartes.