Comments on Denis Fisette “Franz Brentano and higher-order theories of consciousness”
Bruno Leclercq
Argumentos - Revista de Filosofia 2015 DOI: 10.36517/arf.v7i13.19081 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that mereology, especially as formalized by Gilbert Null from Husserl, provides a useful theoretical framework for analyzing Brentano's psychology, and uses that framework to examine Brentano's claims about the unity of the mind and of individual mental acts, along with their difficulties and implications. |
Abstract
For the last few years, research on Brentano’s psychology has turned to mereology for a theoretical framework which could help to address and solve some major problems, such as the question of the unity of the mind despite its being made up of lots of simultaneous and consecutive mental acts or the question of the unity of each of these mental acts despite of its being made up of several descriptive components. By using Gilbert Null’s formalization of Husserl’s mereology we take a closer look at some of Brentano’s claims as well as at their issues and consequences.