Duas teses de Franz Brentano Sobre a consciência
Denis Fisette
Phainomenon October 1, 2011 DOI: 10.2478/phainomenon-2011-0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the principle of the unity of consciousness is the key to resolving the main problems associated with Brentano's theory of consciousness, including duplication, infinite regress, and complexity, and that Brentano's post-1874 modifications to the theory bear on current debates about it. |
Abstract
Abstract In this paper, I propose a reassessment of Brentano’s most important writings on consciousness. My starting point is the formulation of two theses on consciousness that Brentano expresses at the very beginning of the second chapter of the second book of his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, which constitute the foundation of his theory of primary and secondary objects. My working hypothesis rests on the principle of the unity of consciousness, which is the key to most problems generally associated with Brentano’s theory of consciousness. In the second part of my paper, I examine three of these problems, namely, the problem of duplication, that of infinite regress, and that of complexity. In the last part of my paper, I propose an analysis of the principle of the unity of consciousness that takes into account Brentano’s writings after the publication of his Psychology, in 1874, and I briefly appraise the impact, on the atual debates regarding Brentano’s theory of consciousness, of the modifications that Brentano has subjected his theory in several lectures and manuscripts published posthumously.