Qualia, Gemütsphilosophie und Methodologie oder Wie wird aristotelische Scientia zu cartesianischer Unfehlbarkeit? Zum heutigen Widerstreit des Naturalismus und Cartesianismus

Abstract

The neologism, ,,Gemütsphilosophie" – roughly: philosophy of mindedness – I coined for this article, following Kant's use of ,,Gemüt" to render the Latin 'animus', and thus avoid opting for one pole of Cartesian dualism by speaking of 'mind' or 'soul'. Likewise my neologism is a precaution against potential errors cloaked by 'philosophy of mind' or 'philosophy of spirit' (,,Philosophie des Geistes"). The early Modern controversy between materialists and Cartesians today remains virulent, although – or perhaps because – contemporary 'internalists' and 'naturalists' rarely notice that the parameters of their debate are borrowed directly from the early Modern period. I examine and critically assess this historical-conceptual background in three stages. I begin with the key argument against naturalism to which Frederick Dretske (1998) replies (§ 2). This argument proves to be pure Cartesianism; its main methodological principle remains prevallent today, but it antedates Descartes. This principle is critically assessed both methodologically and historically (§§ 3–5). The second stage presents and critically examines the core principles of Dretske's 'Representationalist Thesis' (§§ 6, 7). These two stages issue, third, in a 'changed manner of thinking', which reveals the great extent to which much of 'contemporary', especially anglophone philosophy in principle is pre-Critical, indeed positively Mediaeval (§ 8).