Descartes, consciousness and depersonalization: viewing the history of philosophy from a Strausian perspective.
The Journal of medicine and philosophy February 1984 DOI: 10.1093/jmp/9.1.7 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Descartes' 'invention' of consciousness, or 'the mental,' is tied to the problems of representation and 'the problem of the external world,' and that its novelty emerges through comparison with Greek classical scepticism. Offers speculative psychiatric suggestions about the possible roots of this Cartesian 'invention.' |
Abstract
This paper develops particular Strausian -like themes on the formation and structure of the Cartesian problematic. Particularly, my interest is to link the Cartesian 'invention' of consciousness (or 'the mental') in the philosophy of mind with the issues of representation and 'the problem of the external world' in epistemology. The Cartesian novelty becomes clear by comparing Cartesian scepticism with Greek classical scepticism . I end with some speculative clinical (i.e., psychiatric) suggestions on possible roots of the Cartesian invention.