From Inverted Spectra to Colorless Qualia: AWittgensteinian Critique
William H. Brenner
Philosophical Investigations October 1, 2015 DOI: 10.1111/phin.12048 (opens in new tab)
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Wittgenstein regarded the inverted spectrum problem as a conceptual puzzle calling for dissolution rather than a straight problem calling for a solution, and contends that both physicalist philosophers such as Shoemaker and Block and anti-physicalists such as Jackson fail to appreciate the force of Wittgenstein's arguments. |
Abstract
Abstract: This is terribly hard, Thouless, I'm sorry. I have thought over all this for years. … It is now as if we had ploughed furrows in different parts of a field. There is a lot left to do. (Wittgenstein, to a psychologist friend on how hard it is to get clear about experiential concepts) Judging from their writings, most contemporary analytic philosophers have not been persuaded that “the inverted spectrum problem” is – as Wittgenstein maintained – really a conceptual puzzle calling for dissolution, rather than a straight problem calling for a solution. In this paper, I present Wittgenstein's view as clearly and persuasively as I can, contrasting it with the views of Sidney Shoemaker and Ned Block, two of his more prominent critics. I conclude with a look at Frank Jackson's well‐known Knowledge Argument, which, if successful, would demonstrate the futility of looking for a physicalist solution to the inverted spectrum and related philosophical problems. My goal is to combat what I take to be the common and unfortunate failure – among both physicalistically inclined philosophers, including Shoemaker and Block, and anti‐physicalists, such as Jackson – to appreciate the force of Wittgenstein's arguments.