Defining consciousness
Pragmatics & Cognition December 31, 2010 DOI: 10.1075/pc.18.3.04gal (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that consciousness is best understood through phenomenological description, identifying intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness as core aspects. Proposes that non-reflective self-awareness undermines higher-order representational theories, citing blindsight and motor control as evidence. |
Abstract
I review the problem of how to define consciousness. I suggest that rather than continuing that debate, we should turn to phenomenological description of experience to discover the common aspects of consciousness. In this way we can say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality, phenomenality, and non-reflective self-awareness. I explore this last characteristic in detail and I argue against higher-order representational theories of consciousness, with reference to blindsight and motor control processes.