Freud's Neural Unconscious
David Livingston Smith
May 8, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9780429482816-14 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Historical analysis |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that Freud's philosophy of mind evolved through debates over the mind-body problem and unconscious mental events, with split-consciousness theory linked to hysteria and post-hypnotic suggestion. The author contends that a passage from Freud's psychotherapy of hysteria chapter is crucial to Herzog's sexual theory, and that Freud struggled to explain why patients could not identify his inferences about their pathogenic memories as their own experiences, even when those communications had therapeutic effects. |
Abstract
In this chapter, the author examines aspects of the evolution of Sigmund Freud&s;s philosophy of mind. In particular, the author investigates his views on the &s;mind body problem&s; and the concept of neural unconscious mental events. Epiphenomenalists did not take the final step to materialism by equating mind and brain. The split-consciousness theory was closely, although by no means exclusively, associated with attempts to explain the dynamics of hysteria and the phenomenon of post-hypnotic suggestion. To the authors&s; mind, the following passage from Freud&s;s chapter on the psychotherapy of hysteria in the Studies on Hysteria is crucial in Herzog&s;s sexual theory connection. Freud&s;s problem here was how to explain the fact that his patients were unable to identify his inferences about their pathogenic memories as accounts of their own experiences, even in cases where the communication of these inferences produced some therapeutic effect.