Freud and the mind-brain problem
Ståle Gundersen
The Scandinavian Psychoanalytic Review July 3, 2023 DOI: 10.1080/01062301.2023.2286756 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Freud held a Kantian view of natural scientific knowledge, accepting an identity between conscious and brain states while denying that conscious properties can be physically explained. Contends that, given this identity theory, Freud should not be criticized for constructing neuro-psychological mechanistic explanations of psychoanalytic phenomena, and that his views remain philosophically interesting. |
Abstract
The author argues that we can better understand Freud’s perspective on the mind-brain problem by considering his Kantian view on natural scientific knowledge, namely that there is an essential limit to our knowledge of physical reality. This means that even though conscious states are identical with brain states, it is impossible to explain the events’ conscious properties physically. Further, it is argued that if Freud took an identity theory for granted, it is not fair to criticize him for attempting to construct neuro-psychological mechanistic explanations of psychoanalytic phenomena. It is concluded that Freud’s perspectives on consciousness, the mind-brain problem, and the nature of psychological explanation are philosophically sophisticated and interesting also from a contemporary point of view.