La coscienza fenomenica tra neuroscienze e metafisica. L'Ignorabimus di du Bois-Reymond e il futuro della "science of consciousness"
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that late 19th-century Germany is the neglected context for the emergence of the "hard problem of consciousness," and that many contemporary thought experiments and arguments were first formulated there. Du Bois-Reymond's impossibility thesis rests on an epistemological argument and is characterized by a metaphysical skepticism motivated by the speculative attitude of German philosophy and natural science. |
Abstract
In this paper I offer an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond's thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I argue first that late 19th C. Germany is the neglected context of the emergence of what David Chalmers has called the «hard problem of consciousness», and I show that many contemporary thought experiments and arguments find their first formulation in that very context. Then I examine du Bois-Reymond's position, which turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and to be characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the speculative attitude of German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections I show how the revival of metaphysics in contemporary research on consciousness can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and from the context where it came out.