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Reconsidering the ignorabimus: du Bois-Reymond and the hard problem of consciousness.

Paolo Pecere

Science in context March 1, 2020 DOI: 10.1017/S0269889720000095 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Keywords Consciousness Materialism Mysterianism
Citations 9
Key points Argues that du Bois-Reymond's thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness is grounded in an epistemological argument and metaphysical skepticism, and that reconsidering this position benefits contemporary consciousness research.

Abstract

In this paper I present an interpretation of du Bois-Reymond's thesis on the impossibility of a scientific explanation of consciousness and of its present importance. I reconsider du Bois-Reymond's speech "On the limits of natural science" (1872) in the context of nineteenth-century German philosophy and neurophysiology, pointing out connections and analogies with contemporary arguments on the "hard problem of consciousness." Du Bois-Reymond's position turns out to be grounded on an epistemological argument and characterized by a metaphysical skepticism, motivated by the unfruitful speculative tendency of contemporary German philosophy and natural science. In the final sections, I show how contemporary research can benefit from a reconsideration of this position and its context of emergence, which is a good vantage point to trace open problems in consciousness studies back to their historical development.

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