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Bodily Feeling in Depersonalization: A Phenomenological Account

Giovanna Colombetti, Matthew Ratcliffe

Emotion Review April 1, 2012 DOI: 10.1177/1754073911430131 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that not all bodily feelings are intentional states with the body as their object, and proposes distinguishing three categories of bodily feeling—noematic, noetic, and existential—to better understand the depersonalization experience.

Abstract

This paper addresses the phenomenology of bodily feeling in depersonalization disorder. We argue that not all bodily feelings are intentional states that have the body or part of it as their object. We distinguish three broad categories of bodily feeling: noematic feeling, noetic feeling, and existential feeling. Then we show how an appreciation of the differences between them can contribute to an understanding of the depersonalization experience.

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