A Phenomenological Test of a Theory of Depersonalization
N. L. Gittleson
The British Journal of Psychiatry June 1, 1967 DOI: 10.1192/bjp.113.499.677 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues, following Ackner (1954), that depersonalization arises when an experience of change fits neither a normal framework nor a delusional one, leaving it strange and unreal; if delusions develop, such experiences tend to be absorbed into them and the unreality feeling recedes. |
Abstract
The view that depersonalization experiences can “be regarded as occupying a position somewhere between the delusional and the non-delusional” was first suggested by Ackner (1954) who gave as an example the depressive's experience of malaise. If this is accepted into the normal framework of experience it will be attributed to illness or fatigue. If it is accepted and organized into a delusional framework, the depressive delusion that the body is rotting away (for example) may be exhibited. If, however, the experience cannot be accepted into either a normal or a delusional framework it will remain peculiar, foreign, strange, and unreal and will appear as depersonalization. Ackner commented that if delusions should develop, experiences of change “will tend to be included” within them, and thus not appear as depersonalization. Discussing depressive depersonalization in particular, he considered that “with delusional development, the unreality feeling tends to recede”.