Depersonalization in the light of Brentano's phenomenology
F. Kräupl Taylor
British Journal of Medical Psychology December 1, 1982 DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8341.1982.tb01514.x (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that depersonalization symptoms can be understood via Brentano's view that conscious experiences are directed at intentional objects while the person is simultaneously aware of himself as a mentally active ego. In depersonalized individuals, a subsidiary mentally active ego with some autonomy emerges, and its activities shape symptoms: exteroceptive activity leads to derealization, interoceptive to desomatization, and introspective to de-ideation, de-emotivity, or automatization. |
Abstract
The symptoms of depersonalization are examined in the light of the phenomenological views evolved by Franz Brentano. He had come to the conclusion that our conscious experiences are primarily directed towards objects (contents) that are ‘phenomenal’ or ‘intentional’ in the sense that they do not necessarily have counterparts in the external world. In experiencing such an object, a person becomes simultaneously aware of himself as a mentally active ego. In depersonalized individuals, there emerges a mentally active ego of a subsidiary kind which has some autonomy of action and is hazily glimpsed in introspection. The clinical symptoms of depersonalization vary according to the mental activities engaged in by the subsidiary ego. These mental activities may be exteroceptive (leading to derealization), interoceptive (leading to desomatization), or introspective (leading respectively to de‐ideation, de‐emotivity, or automatization).
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Citations in the library
Cited by 3
- Emotion and the Unreal Self: Depersonalization Disorder and De-Affectualization Emotion Review April 1, 2012
- Unpacking the depersonalization syndrome: an exploratory factor analysis on the Cambridge Depersonalization Scale Psychological Medicine October 1, 2005
- Depersonalization and meditation. Psychiatry May 1990