Phenomenal Experience
Oxford Scholarship Online April 19, 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198800088.003.0013 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Proposes a theory of phenomenal consciousness based on a "way of appearing" and endorses a version of the Cartesian Theater. Argues that treating consciousness as a relation between a subject and what she is conscious of creates a difficulty for explaining hallucination, since the object of awareness is missing, and distinguishes this view from direct realist disjunctivism. |
Abstract
This paper presents a sketch of a theory of phenomenal consciousness, one that builds on the notion of a “way of appearing,” and draws out various consequences and problems for the view. I unabashedly endorse a version of the Cartesian Theater, while assessing the prospects for making such a view work. As I treat phenomenal consciousness as a relation between a subject and what it is she is conscious of, I face a difficulty in making sense of hallucination, since the object of awareness is missing. I distinguish my position from direct realists who endorse disjunctivism, and end on a somewhat speculative note.