The burden of embodied cognition.

Abstract

The thesis of embodied cognition has developed as an alternative to the view that cognition is mediated, at least in part, by symbolic representations. A useful testing ground for the embodied cognition hypothesis is the representation of concepts. An embodied view of concept representation argues that concepts are represented in a modality-specific format. I argue that questions about representational format are tractable only in the context of explicit hypotheses about how information spreads among conceptual representations and sensorimotor systems. When reasonable alternatives to the embodied cognition hypothesis are clearly defined, the available evidence does not distinguish between the embodied cognition hypothesis and those alternatives. Furthermore, I argue, the available data that are theoretically constraining indicate that concepts are more than just sensory and motor content. As such, the embodied/nonembodied debate is either largely resolved or at a point where the embodied and nonembodied approaches are no longer coherently distinct theories. This situation merits a reconsideration of what the available evidence can tell us about the structure of the conceptual system. I suggest that it is the independence of thought from perception and action that makes human cognition special-and that independence is made possible by the representational distinction between concepts and sensorimotor representations.