The strength of weak embodiment.
Carlos Tirado, Omid Khatin-Zadeh, Melina Gastelum, Nathan Leigh-Jones, Fernando Marmolejo-Ramos
International journal of psychological research January 1, 2018 DOI: 10.21500/20112084.3420 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe embodiment approach to cognition, which grounds mental processes in bodily experience, faces resistance due to evidence against its strong forms. This approach breaks from Cartesian dualism by treating cognition as rooted in modal experience, aligns with emergent materialism, and is supported by experimental research. However, embodiment must still address abstractions, theoretical debates about representations, and neuroscientific findings questioning the role of sensorimotor properties in cognition. While strong embodiment is challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, weak embodiment is supported by compelling evidence. Future research should focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and redirect efforts toward cross-modal correspondence.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Cross-modal correspondence. Embodiment Emergent materialism The modulatory system |
| Key finding | Argues that while strong embodiment is challenged, weak embodiment is supported by evidence, and future research should focus on psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and cross-modal correspondence. |
Abstract
While popular within some cognitive science approaches, the embodiment approach has still found resistance, particularly in light of evidence arguing against strong forms of embodiment. Among other things, the embodiment approach breaks away from the Cartesian ontology of the modulatory system. We claim that the advantages of the embodiment approach are: a) it grounds cognition into modal experience, b) it is harmonious with a materialist philosophy of mind (emergent materialism), and c) it is supported by experimental research in various fields. However, embodiment must still address abstractions, theoretical misunderstandings (representations vs non-representations) and neuroscientific findings that challenge the extension and relevance of sensorimotor properties into cognitive processes. While the strong version of embodiment is seriously challenged by conceptual and physiological setbacks, its weak version is supported by compelling evidence. We suggest future research focus on the psychophysiological bases of grounded cognition and redirect efforts towards the field of cross-modal correspondence.