Cognition Beyond the Brain
Corporeal Theology January 5, 2023 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192884589.003.0006 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the replacement hypothesis accounts for sensorimotor tasks but not 'representation-hungry' cognition, while the constitution hypothesis faces unresolved disagreement about the criteria for circumscribing cognition; even weak versions of both draw attention to how cognitive tasks are 'scaffolded' by environmental resources. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter details and evaluates of the ‘replacement’ and ‘constitution’ hypotheses, the two remaining hypotheses of embodied cognition which were introduced in Chapter 2. The replacement hypothesis seeks to explain cognitive processes by replacing internal mental representations with sensorimotor engagement with the world. It elegantly describes how internal mental models are not required for outfielders catching a ball or robots navigating a maze. However, certain ‘representation-hungry’ cognitive tasks reason about objects not immediately available to perception and are therefore less amenable to replacement-style explanations. The significance of sensorimotor engagement with the environment leads to the constitution hypothesis, which suggests that cognitive processes extend beyond the brain, and are co-constituted by bodily states and environmental resources. However, significant disagreement persists concerning the criteria by which to circumscribe cognition, and some argue that few if any cognitive tasks are implemented on extra-cranial physical media. Even if strong versions of the replacement and constitution hypotheses are limited in scope, weak versions nevertheless draw attention to the way in which a multitude of cognitive tasks are ‘scaffolded’ by environmental resources. In following chapters these views of cognition will be applied to analyse embodied religious practices.