Skip to content

The philosophy of mind needs a better metaphysics

Martin Mahner

Advances in Consciousness Research June 17, 2015 DOI: 10.1075/aicr.92.12mah (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that philosophy of mind suffers from the absence of a fully fledged, generally accepted metaphysical theory, causing recurring unresolved problems such as the zombie argument against materialism and the functionalist claim that machines could develop consciousness. Proposes that Mario Bunge's materialist ontological theory offers problem-solving power for these debates.

Abstract

The philosophy of mind employs plenty of metaphysical concepts such as “(mental) property”, “state”, “event”, “identity”, “causation”, or “supervenience”. However, it has no fully fledged metaphysical theory, let alone a generally accepted one. This flaw slows down the progress of the field in that the same old problems keep being discussed over and over without much hope of resolution. Examples are the (in)famous zombie argument against materialism, and the functionalist claim that machines could develop consciousness. This paper expounds the materialist ontological theory of Mario Bunge and explores its problem-solving power.

Comparable studies

Other theoretical and historical papers on philosophy of mind, most cited first.

Citations in the library

Explore topics