Erroneous Experience
Sean Enda Power
February 6, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9781351249492-4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that whether an experience is illusory depends on its temporal extension and embedding and on whether the constitution of experience allows naïve realism. Proposes conditions distinguishing illusion, hallucination, and anosognosia, and introduces anosognosia and a specific form termed "conflationary error" to expand the taxonomy of erroneous perceptual experience beyond the standard illusion-versus-hallucination distinction. |
Abstract
This chapter argues that the case for a particular instance of experience to be illusory depends on how such an experience extends and is embedded in time and on how the constitution of experience allows or disallows naïve realism. It also argues for some conditions for illusion, hallucination, and anosognosia, and distinguishes between them. The chapter outlines the conditions of illusion. It distinguishes illusion from other kinds of erroneous experience, in particular, hallucination. The chapter expands the taxonomy of erroneous experience beyond the distinction between illusion and hallucination. It introduces and develops anosognosia, and a specific kind of it: conflationary error. Perceptual erroneous experiences are frequently categorised under one of two kinds: illusions and hallucinations. In contemporary philosophy of perception, illusion and hallucination are almost without exception treated as if they are distinct kinds of error. The chapter defines different kinds of erroneous experiences: various kinds of illusion, hallucination, and anosognosia.