Tolerant enactivist cognitive science
Thomas Raleigh
Philosophical Explorations May 4, 2018 DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2018.1477981 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 5 |
| Key points | Argues that the arguments Hutto and Myin give for the stronger anti-representational claim—that ascribing representational content to internal, sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion—do not succeed, and proposes that enactivists adopt the weaker non-representational position, on which such ascription is simply not compulsory for psychological explanation, as their default view. |
Abstract
Enactivist (Embodied, Embedded, etc.) approaches in cognitive science and philosophy of mind are sometimes, though not always, conjoined with an anti-representational commitment. A weaker anti-representational claim is that ascribing representational content to internal/sub-personal processes is not compulsory when giving psychological explanations. A stronger anti-representational claim is that the very idea of ascribing representational content to internal, sub-personal processes is a theoretical confusion. This paper criticises some of the arguments made by Hutto and Myin (2013, 2017) for the stronger anti-representational claim and suggests that the default Enactivist view should be the weaker non-representational position.