INVESTIGANDO O AUTISMO: TEORIA DA MENTE E A ALTERNATIVA FENOMENOLÓGICA
R. Lima
Revista do Nufen April 1, 2019 DOI: 10.26823/revistadonufen.vol11.n01ensaio49 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the cognitive 'Theory of Mind' account of autism, which frames autistic features as a failure of meta-representation, is challenged by phenomenological contributions. Proposes that early sensorimotor disturbances, rather than meta-representation deficits, disrupt primary and secondary intersubjectivity in autism, and that this perspective critiques mental module and computational models by highlighting embodied, pre-reflective, intersubjective experience. |
Abstract
In contemporary debates about autism, "Theory of Mind" considers the main autistic features as a failure in meta-representation, making it impossible to understand the mental states of others. This article aims to carry out the critical study of the cognitive paradigm and to introduce the contributions of phenomenology. Researchers in this field hold that thoughts, emotions and intentions are already expressed and understood in explicit behaviors, supporting the mutual attunement that underlies human sociability. Thus, in the case of autism, before the onset of problems in the metrepresentation, there would be early disturbances in the sensorimotor dimension, interfering in processes of primary and secondary intersubjectivity. We conclude that phenomenological perspective allows the critique of notions of mental modules and computational models, highlighting the embodied, pre-reflective and intersubjective mental experience, thus contributing to a new understanding of the autistic ways of suffering and experiencing the world.