A Critical Review of Theory of Mind and Comparative Analysis of Alternative Theories

Abstract

This study explores the questions, “How can we understand the minds of others?” and “How do we perceive and interpret knowledge?” by examining their significance across disciplines such as neuroscience and philosophy. Traditionally, the Simulation Theory(ST), a prominent version of the Theory of Mind, has dominated discussions on this issue. This paper critiques such traditional accounts and sheds light on three alternative perspectives— Direct Social Perception(DSP), embodimentism, and enactivism—through comparative analysis. These three perspectives commonly reject the core premise of ST, which views others’ minds as internal brain states that cannot be directly observed. DSP focuses on the possibility of directly perceiving others’ mental states. Embodimentism emphasizes the formation of cognition through interaction with the body. Enactivism stands out by stressing the relational process through which meaning is co-constructed in social interaction. Thud it understands social cognition not as an individual’s internal cognitive capacity, but as a dynamic process emerging through social engagement. Accordingly, this study endeavors to illuminate our understanding of others and the concept of “knowing” in a more nuanced manner by moving beyond fixed viewpoints or fragmentary approaches. To this end, it examines the theories of DSP, embodimentism, and enactivism, analyzing their implications and significance as alternatives to traditional models of mind.