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Freedom Under Naturalistic Dualism

Arturo Macías

preprint DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4485743 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Key points Argues that within naturalistic dualism, free will is a legitimate mental object constructed by evaluating possible futures conditional on one's actions, and that it depends on the future being unrememberable. Conjectures that time asymmetry relates to fundamental ontic randomness, and contends that abhorrence of evil deeds remains warranted absent causative agency because such deeds signal an unworthy conscientious perpetrator.

Abstract

This article explores the issue of freedom in the framework of naturalistic dualism. Given that for physicalism the Universe is no more than the execution of the mechanical (either deterministic or stochastic) laws of Physics, reality is chance and necessity. On the other hand, consciousness is immediately real. By evaluating the set of possible futures conditional on their own actions a subject builds a legitimate mental object that is the scope of their "freedom". The existence of free will depends on the fact that the future cannot be remembered. The philosophical relevance of a better scientific understanding of time asymmetry is underscored and it is conjectured that it is related to the existence of fundamental (ontic) randomness. The article closes with a short discussion on the moral consequences of this vision: The abhorrence that evil deeds produce is granted in absence of causative agency because they signal an unworthy conscientious perpetrator.

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