A Dual-Aspect Model of Subjectivity, Teleology, and Non-Libertarian Agency
Stefan Anderson
Zenodo (CERN European Organization for Nuclear Research) August 16, 2026 preprint DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.21969711 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a dual-aspect ontology, where physical and phenomenal aspects are inseparable, allows for a non-libertarian, non-mechanistic account of agency grounded in teleonomy, without supernatural freedom or reductive physicalism. |
Abstract
This paper outlines a dual-aspect model of subjectivity and agency that rejects the standard division between libertarian free will, compatibilism, and mechanistic determinism. Living beings instantiate a single underlying substance with two inseparable aspects—physical and phenomenal. Subjectivity is the phenomenal interior of life itself, not an epiphenomenon of physical processes nor an independent mental substance. Within this framework, agency is the organism’s phenomenal expression of an immanent cosmic direction—teleonomy as the structural basis of teleology. Will is not free in the libertarian sense, nor reducible to mechanistic causation; it functions as the organism’s instrument for realizing intrinsic meaning. Drawing on Spinoza’s dual-aspect monism, Schopenhauer’s inner phenomenal force, Hans Jonas’s teleonomic biology, and contemporary emergence theory, the paper argues that a coherent, non-theistic, non-mechanistic account of agency is possible without invoking supernatural freedom or collapsing into reductive physicalism. Keywords: dual‑aspect ontology, phenomenal interiority, internal teleology, stratified agency, non‑libertarian agency, biological phenomenality, philosophy of mind, metaphysics