Which Bodies Have Minds?
Jennifer McWeeny
Feminist Philosophy of Mind July 7, 2022 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190867614.003.0016 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that theories of mind implicitly encode patterns of mental attribution, analyzed through three components: ratio, comparison, and constitution. Russellian panpsychism exemplifies a "selective" pattern attributing minds only to certain bodies, while Cavendishian panpsychism exemplifies an "unrestricted" pattern attributing mind to every body. The author contends that this taxonomy can inspire new theories of mind and liberatory social configurations. |
Abstract
Abstract: Theories about what a mind is entail views about who (or what) has a mind and vice versa. This chapter reframes the classic problem of how the mind interacts with the body in terms of the question of mental attribution: Which bodies have minds? Critical social theorists’ descriptions of mental attribution associated with the bodies of women, Black people, colonized people, laborers, and others, reveals three metaphysical components of mental attribution that are respectively associated with experiences of immanence and nonbeing, dehumanization, and objectification and hypermateriality: (1) the ratio component, (2) the comparison component, and (3) the constitution component. A theory’s approach to each of these components collectively forms its “attribution pattern.” Physicalist panpsychisms provide ready examples of attribution patterns that apply to the set of all bodies that exist. Russellian panpsychism illustrates a “selective” attribution pattern that attributes minds (or mentality) only to certain bodies, while Cavendishian panpsychism exhibits an “unrestricted” attribution pattern that attributes a mind to each and every body. These contrary views help to establish a taxonomy of mental attribution patterns that promises to inspire fresh theories of mind and liberatory configurations of the social.