AbstractThe enactivist paradigm of embodied cognition represents a powerful alternative to Cartesian and cognitivist approaches in the philosophy of mind. On this view, the body plays a constitutive role in the integrated functioning of perception, affect, and other cognitive processes. Enactivism shares many of the central themes of feminist theory, and is extended to apply to social and...
AbstractThe subject of this chapter is loving attention, a way of paying attention to others that is motivated by care, respect, and kindness. This way of attending, integral to Mahayana Buddhist philosophy of mind and ethics, is also central to many influential feminist conceptions of moral perception. Drawing on both traditions, the chapter offers an account of loving attention and considers...
Abstract This chapter considers the ontological implications of encountering varying levels of intelligibility when one traverses social structures, such as when one immigrates to a new culture or works in a place with people of a different economic class than one’s own. This chapter terms this phenomenon “world-traveling,” which the chapter understands as the shift in self-experience that...
Abstract: Theories about what a mind is entail views about who (or what) has a mind and vice versa. This chapter reframes the classic problem of how the mind interacts with the body in terms of the question of mental attribution: Which bodies have minds? Critical social theorists’ descriptions of mental attribution associated with the bodies of women, Black people, colonized people, laborers,...