Towards a Comparative Study of Animal Consciousness
Biological Theory August 30, 2022 DOI: 10.1007/s13752-022-00409-x (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA bottom-up comparative study of animal minds, grounded in cognitive ethology, can advance a biological science of consciousness by removing humans from the center of reference. The article uses the pathological complexity thesis to argue that state-based behavioral life history theory provides a firm foundation for such a study. Comparing the life histories of gastropods and arthropods offers insight into the possible origins and function of consciousness for organisms in their natural environments.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Philosophy Biology |
| Key finding | Argues that comparing the life histories of gastropods and arthropods, using the pathological complexity thesis and state-based behavioral life history theory, can illuminate the origins and function of consciousness. |
Abstract
In order to develop a true biological science of consciousness, we have to remove humans from the center of reference and develop a bottom-up comparative study of animal minds, as Donald Griffin intended with his call for a “cognitive ethology.” In this article, I make use of the pathological complexity thesis (Veit 2022a, b, c) to show that we can firmly ground a comparative study of animal consciousness by drawing on the resources of state-based behavioral life history theory. By comparing the different life histories of gastropods and arthropods, we will be able to make better sense of the possible origins of consciousness and its function for organisms in their natural environments.