C. A. Strong—Real Materialism, Evolutionary Naturalism, Panpsychism
July 7, 2023 DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198879466.003.0018 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that a genuinely realistic materialism must be all-out realist about consciousness, and presents Charles Augustus Strong's evolutionary naturalism and panpsychism as an exemplary version of this view, contrasting it with R. W. Sellars's hesitant choice of emergentism over panpsychism. |
Abstract
Abstract This chapter offers an account of what a genuinely realistic materialism or genuinely realistic physicalism looks like. (The key is that it must be all-out realist about consciousness.) It combines this with an exposition of some of the work of Charles Augustus Strong—who is, according to this account, an exemplary, genuinely realistic materialist. C. A. Strong, who has been almost entirely forgotten, is one of the very best twentieth-century American philosophers. His work in epistemology is outstanding—it’s not clear that his general philosophical account of perception can be bettered. The same is true of his work in metaphysics. This chapter focuses on his metaphysics, his evolutionary naturalism and the all-out panpsychism that he takes it to entail. It compares him with another evolutionary naturalist, his contemporary, R. W. Sellars, who, with some hesitation, chose an emergentist account of the existence of consciousness over a panpsychist one.