Not extended, but enhanced
Nada Gligorov
June 12, 2023 DOI: 10.4324/9781003105596-21 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 3 |
| Key points | Argues that Carter and Pritchard's extended-mind defense of cognitive enhancement leaves some enhancers vulnerable to the axiological objection, and that criteria for cognitive integration apply even to enhancers causing internal cognitive changes. Contends these internal improvements need not affect cognitive character or compromise cognitive agency. |
Abstract
This chapter will address the axiological objection to cognitive enhancement, which is that the use of cognitive enhancers reduces the value of cognitive achievement. In a recent defense of cognitive enhancement, Carter and Pritchard (2019) utilize the extended mind hypothesis to argue that cognitive enhancers do not compromise knowledge acquisition. In this chapter, it will be demonstrated that the reliance on the extended mind hypothesis leaves some cognitive enhancers vulnerable to the axiological objection. To expand the scope of the argument, it will be shown that criteria for cognitive integration are applicable even to enhancers that cause changes to cognition internal to the human organism. This chapter will begin with a description of several cognitive enhancers and with the identification of the type of cognitive process they purportedly improve. It will then be demonstrated that even when those improvements are internal, they need not affect cognitive character and do not compromise cognitive agency.