The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Contemporary Philosophy of Perception

Abstract

The distinction between “direct” and “indirect” theories of perception has had somewhat of a chequered history. There was a time when to call a theory of perception a version of “direct realism” was almost equivalent to calling it “hopelessly naïve”. Time has told, however, that it was this assumption which was naïve, and nowadays the majority of theories on the market like to see themselves as direct realist. Interestingly, however, when we consider the way the complement term “indirect” has come to be employed in contemporary philosophy of perception, we find that the pendulum has swung almost completely the other way. Now, to call a theory “indirect” seems to have become pejorative. But I suggest that this preconception is just as misguided as the one it has replaced. In this paper, I firstly argue that if we take the time to get clear about the theoretical basis of the direct/indirect distinction, we find that a number of promising contemporary theories of perception are in fact properly classified as indirect. I then go on to show, in the light of this, exactly what would be required for a theory of perception to qualify as a version of direct realism.