Is pain representational?
Belgrade Philosophical Annual July 12, 2024 DOI: 10.5937/bpa2302025a (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Strong representationalism Transparency Pain experience Edenic properties Proprietary concepts |
| Key points | Argues that realist reductive and irrealist versions of strong representationalism are untenable based on a simple empirical argument. |
Abstract
Representationalism in philosophy of perception has become more or less the dominant view. There are various versions of it not all of which are motivated by the same set of concerns. In this paper, I will focus on what has come to be known as strong representationalism. This view has reductive and non-reductive versions, which are usually paired with realist and irrealist versions respectively. Here, first, I will develop a simple, largely empirical, argument against realist reductive version. Later, rather more briefly, I will extend the argument to cover irrealist representationalism.