Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-consciousness and enactivism
Controversies October 15, 2020 DOI: 10.1075/cvs.16.09sen (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Case report Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that the enactivist attempt to naturalize Husserl's absolute subjectivity exemplifies a polemical argumentative form the author calls "the harmonizing argument", and that this attempt has limitations because absolute subjectivity cannot be naturalized. The author contends that such arguments can nonetheless yield positive epistemic results. |
Abstract
Abstract In this article, I single out the characteristics of a polemical type of argument that I dub “the harmonizing argument”. Contenders that use the harmonizing argument aim to persuade their audience that it is possible to harmonize two opposed positions. My case study is the enactivists’ attempt to naturalize Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. I first present Husserl’s account of time-consciousness. I clarify why absolute subjectivity cannot be naturalized. I continue by interpreting the enactivists’ attempt to naturalizes absolute subjectivity as exemplifying the harmonizing argument. I present the limitations of this attempt, and I conclude by pointing out the possible positive epistemic results of using this type of argument.