Descriptive psychology: Franz Brentano's project today
Guillaume Fréchette, Hamid Taïeb
European Journal of Philosophy May 21, 2023 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12868 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that the history of the two central questions of intentionality and consciousness has often been reduced to specific and recent discussions, a narrowing attributed to a dominant post-Second World War approach to the history of philosophy in England and the United States. |
Abstract
What does it mean for a thought, idea, belief, or wish to be about something? And what do we mean when we say that we are aware of thinking, presenting, believing, or wishing when we do? Much of the philosophy of mind of the 20th and 21st centuries has focused on these two questions. Perhaps due to a certain dominant way of doing the history of philosophy in England and the United States after the Second World War, the history of these two questions—intentionality and consciousness—has often been reduced to specific and recent discussions.