Self‐awareness and self‐understanding
B. Rousse
European Journal of Philosophy July 25, 2018 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12377 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Zahavi's taxonomy of selfhood must be refined to include "pre-reflective self-understanding," a normative dimension manifest in habits and pre-reflective absorption in the world. Drawing on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Frankfurt, the author contends that pre-reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-understanding are co-constitutive, and that separating self-awareness from practical immersion distorts the phenomena. |
Abstract
In this paper, I critically examine Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self and show how the distinction he makes among “ pre ‐ reflective minimal, ” “ interpersonal, ” and “ normative ” dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call “ pre ‐ reflective self ‐ understanding. ” The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person's pre ‐ reflective absorption in the world. After reviewing Zahavi's multidimensional account and revealing this gap in his explanatory taxonomy, I draw upon Heidegger, Merleau ‐ Ponty, and Frankfurt in order to sketch an account of pre ‐ reflective self ‐ understanding. I end by raising an objection to Zahavi's claim for the primitive and foundational status of pre ‐ reflective self ‐ awareness. To carve off self ‐ awareness from the self's practical immersion in a situation where things and possibilities already matter and draw one to act is to distort the phenomena. A more careful phenomenology of pre ‐ reflective action shows that pre ‐ reflective self ‐ awareness and pre ‐ reflective self ‐ understanding are co ‐ constitutive, both mutually for each other and jointly for everyday experience.