Minimal self y las teorías de la identidad personal en fenomenología

The paper examines the relevance of the minimal self—a concept advanced by Dan Zahavi—for a phenomenological theory of identity, using the phenomenon of coming of age as a lens. It first characterizes the minimal self and analyzes its premises and arguments. Then it argues that defending the minimal self faces challenges when accounting for life experiences that are intersubjectively constituted, such as illness, age, or gender. Finally, drawing on Simone de Beauvoir's writings, it offers a description of advanced age as a personal discovery of being old, suggesting that such experiences require an intersubjective perspective for full understanding.

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Abstract

This paper focuses on the relevance thatthe notion of minimal self, as proposed e.g.by Zahavi, for a phenomenological theory ofidentity. I will do so by analyzing the phenomenonof coming of age. Firstly, I characterizethe notion of minimal self as expressed in Zahavi’sclaims with a view to analyzing premisesand arguments on which it is grounded.Nevertheless, secondly, defending minimalself might pose challenges when it comes tocharacterize certain life experiences that seemto be constituted intersubjectively. In particular,phenomena such as illness, age or genderare not exclusively constituted in individual,solitary experience, but rather they can onlybe ultimately understood by the very subjectin intersubjective perspective. The argument Ioffer in the third step of my exposition, is thedescription of advanced age in terms of personaldiscovery of being old, drawing mainly onSimone de Beauvoir’s writings.