Minimal self y las teorías de la identidad personal en fenomenología
Agata Joanna Bąk
Bajo Palabra December 27, 2021 DOI: 10.15366/bp2021.28.002 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that the notion of the minimal self is challenged by intersubjectively constituted life experiences like aging, which can be understood through personal discovery of being old. |
Abstract
This paper focuses on the relevance thatthe notion of minimal self, as proposed e.g.by Zahavi, for a phenomenological theory ofidentity. I will do so by analyzing the phenomenonof coming of age. Firstly, I characterizethe notion of minimal self as expressed in Zahavi’sclaims with a view to analyzing premisesand arguments on which it is grounded.Nevertheless, secondly, defending minimalself might pose challenges when it comes tocharacterize certain life experiences that seemto be constituted intersubjectively. In particular,phenomena such as illness, age or genderare not exclusively constituted in individual,solitary experience, but rather they can onlybe ultimately understood by the very subjectin intersubjective perspective. The argument Ioffer in the third step of my exposition, is thedescription of advanced age in terms of personaldiscovery of being old, drawing mainly onSimone de Beauvoir’s writings.