Redirecting the incredulous stare: contemporary metaphysical complacency and the flanking manoeuvre of developmental scepticism
J. Schellenberg
Religious Studies April 7, 2025 DOI: 10.1017/s0034412525000216 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a developmental form of scepticism undermines the common presupposition that humanity has developed enough to reasonably treat unconventional metaphysical propositions, such as panpsychism, as obviously false. Proposes that absorbing this scepticism could lead enquiry toward a more general orientation. |
Abstract
Abstract With development understood as improving change, and working at the macroscale or species level, I sketch the conceptual background for a new, developmental form of scepticism. Then I use developmental scepticism to critique a proposition that functions as a presupposition of the popular contemporary rejection of unconventional metaphysical propositions (MUPs) and specifically of panpsychism: namely, that we have experienced enough relevant development as a species to make it reasonable for the community of enquiry to treat such ideas as obviously false. Finally, I briefly suggest a possible step beyond developmental scepticism toward a more general orientation in enquiry which might naturally follow such scepticism once its motivating ideas are absorbed.