Epistemic immodesty and embodied rationality
G. Rolla
September 1, 2016 DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2016.v39n3.gr (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the dream argument constitutes a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated, and proposes a phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noë's actionist account of perceptual consciousness. On this view, perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded as a form of "embodied rationality," which the author claims dissolves the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty. |
Abstract
Based on Pritchard’s distinction (2012, 2016) between favoring and discriminating epistemic grounds, and on how those grounds bear on the elimination of skeptical possibilities, I present the dream argument as a moderate skeptical possibility that can be reasonably motivated. In order to block the dream argument skeptical conclusion, I present a version of phenomenological disjunctivism based on Noe’s actionist account of perceptual consciousness (2012). This suggests that perceptual knowledge is rationally grounded because it is a form of embodied achievement – what I call embodied rationality –, which offers a way of dissolving the pseudo-problem of epistemic immodesty, namely, the seemingly counterintuitive thesis that one can acquire rationally grounded knowledge that one is not in a radical skeptical scenario.